



ARMY TALKS

RESTRICTED
ETO-U.S. ARMY

New World DUMBARTON OAKS

WORLD SECURITY : THE OFFICIAL PROPOSALS AGREEMENT ON WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS

The following statement on the tentative proposals for the maintenance of peace and security agreed on at the Four-Power talks at Dumbarton Oaks, in the United States:

His Majesty's Government have received the report of their delegation to the conference held in Washington from Aug. 21 and Oct. 2, with the delegations of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China. The conference was held at Dumbarton Oaks, in the United States, and was attended by representatives of the four great powers. The conference was held in a room which was formerly the residence of the late Mr. Dumbarton Oaks, and was named in his honor.

CO-ORDINATION OF POLICIES SPECIAL PROBLEMS

(1) The General Assembly should make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies of international economic, social and other specialized agencies brought into relation with the arrangements in the Security Council. The General Assembly should make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies of international economic, social and other specialized agencies brought into relation with the arrangements in the Security Council.

The German counter-attack heavily and south of Metz, where the American Army (3) stands across the Moselle River. The German First Army to the north of Metz, as well as St. Celier, (3).

CHAP. I-PURPOSES

The purposes of the organization should be to maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about conditions of general disarmament and tranquillity.

SOVIET ENDS WAR WITH BULGARIANS

Sofia Forms a New Cabinet-
Veteran Communist Becomes
One of the Regents

BY SYDNEY GRIGG
25 Writers to The New York Times
LONDON, Sept. 15.-The Soviet Union has ended the war with Bulgaria, who tied the country to the last four years of the Government.

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
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
ARMY TALKS

"The purpose of the program is to give the soldier psychological preparation for combat, and a better realization of the import of every phase of his military training. Emphasis will be placed on combat orientation. The mental and physical conditioning of the enemy, and a proper evaluation of the enemy's weapons and fighting qualities will be stressed. A better understanding of the background of the war, and the soldier's responsibilities in the post-war world will also be developed."

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL EISENHOWER.

(Extract from letter ETO, 1 August 1944, AG 352/2 OpSS, Subject: Combat Orientation Program.)

DUMBARTON OAKS Framework for Peace




WHILE soldiers of the United Nations have been busily engaged in winning the war, and doing a whale of a job, it is good to know that national leaders have been working hard, not only to win the war, but also to win the peace.

Smashing the Germans and Japs at both ends of the Axis is a full-time job. The military aspect of this task is engaging the concentrated attention of several million American soldiers and sailors who have been busily occupied in defeating the enemy. There hasn't been any real opportunity for reading the papers with care and understanding. That's one reason

why this ARMY TALKS discusses what has recently happened at a conference at Dumbarton Oaks. Another reason is that, even if you did read something about this conference of the Big Four, its meaning may not be obvious unless there is also a clear understanding of other things which have been going on.

Dumbarton Oaks is a country house just outside Washington, where representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China have been meeting for about six weeks, trying to find the best way to prevent World War III—and all wars in the future.



Dumbarton Oaks is also the name given to the conference held there, which has laid effective groundwork for an organization to maintain peace by force.

Dumbarton Oaks is our charter of hope for the future.

WAR VICTORY NOT ENOUGH

It is obvious that licking the enemy even to the point of "unconditional surrender" is not enough. We learned that twenty-five years ago. What we have to do, in addition, is to capitalize on our military victory. We have to see that we build a world situation which will guarantee—as much as human beings can—that it doesn't happen again.

That's the tough nut which military and political experts have been trying to crack at Dumbarton Oaks.

For three years the United Nations have been working together in a common strategy for war. They have also, often behind the

scenes, been working just as hard for a common strategy for peace. Results attained so far have been crystallized in the announcements from Dumbarton Oaks.

It is not a final plan. But it is a realistic plan with *teeth in it*. It is an intelligible plan. It is an understandable plan, if the legal and diplomatic words and phrases are stripped away.

It was proposed at Dumbarton Oaks that:

1. There be established an international organization to be known as **THE UNITED NATIONS**.

2. This group of nations—that is those fighting the Axis—will form the nucleus of and sponsor a world-wide international organization to maintain world peace and security; to take steps to prevent breaches of the peace; to suppress acts of aggression; and to settle disputes by peaceful means.

3. Eleven men, forming a *Security Council*, would be empowered to employ what force is necessary to maintain world peace.

4. Acting with this Council, but subordinate to it, there would be a *General Assembly*, open to all peace-loving nations.

5. An International Court of Justice is recommended, whose job it would be to deal with legal disputes between nations.

These are the general principles. A natural question immediately arises:

But what's different about this; isn't it just the old League of Nations disguised?

Not if the Dumbarton Oaks plan works out as recommended. That's the straight answer, and here are some reasons:

1. The United Nations' suggested charter, unlike the old League Covenant, is independent of the forthcoming peace treaties with the Axis. They are parallel projects. We arrange our terms with the Axis and satellite nations, and at the same time plan a new world order—but each of these plans is separate from the other. The fact that they were mixed up together in 1919 was one of the reasons the League of Nations didn't work. The United States Senate was willing to sign a treaty of peace, but not to agree to join the League. Also, organization of world peace cannot proceed vigorously when it is tied to many emotional post-war problems.

2. The new organization would deal not only with acts of aggression of war, but would have power to act when the mere *threat of war* was recognized. (This point will be amplified later).

3. In the old League of Nations both the *Council* and the unwieldy *Assembly* had to vote on peace or war. In the plan now proposed this obligation will fall on the shoulders of the *Security Council*, composed of eleven men, acting for eleven nations.

But which eleven nations? Four, and possibly five, will have permanent seats on the Security Council. The United States, Great

Britain, the Soviet Union and China.

It is urged that "in due course" France should be the occupant of the fifth permanent seat.

The other six seats are to be filled by smaller nations, elected by the General Assembly, each to be represented for two years and not to be eligible for immediate re-election.

One writer has suggested that these six might for the first term be Canada, Australia, Brazil, Holland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Others believe that Norway, Belgium, Poland, Greece and India should also receive serious consideration.



The organization would exist first for *security* as such, rather than for abstract *justice* as such. This fact is disguised in tactful language, but it is evident that the charter members, the Big Four, are willing to assume in peace, as they have in war, the lion's share of the burden. Will lesser nations feel that they have been slighted, and that they are asked to place too much trust in the good faith of the "big fellows?"

"It seems hardly likely," says the *London Times*. Many of them have had too recent experience with the trouble which may come to a "little fellow"—such as Holland, Belgium, Denmark and the others—in a world so constituted

that force and aggression can run riot. An opportunity, as specified in one of the clauses of the proposed charter, will be given the smaller nations to cooperate *regionally* in the settlement of what might appear to be localized threats to peace. An example from recent history might be the Chaco War, which in the 1920's dragged on for several years between Paraguay and Bolivia. This could have been tackled regionally by inter-American nations.

Other differences from the League of Nations:

1. A permanent staff of military experts would be appointed to "advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, on the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, and on the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament."

PEACE BY FORCE

There are two points to note. For one thing there is frank recognition that in the kind of world in which we live force may be necessary. We have long recognized its need in local and national policing. (*How* an international force will be set up is outlined later in this issue.)

For another thing, there is no decision to disarm *victor* nations, or even to reduce their armaments below the danger point, as was done last time. For years, quoting the Versailles treaty, the Germans claimed the right to rearm on the ground that other nations did not carry out their pious intention and cut down armaments to the German level. This controversy pro-

vided material for the arguments of the pacifists, especially in the United States and Great Britain.

2. One way in which the League of Nations was handicapped in getting action against an aggressor was that the Assembly of the League required a unanimous vote. One veto could block important action. (Imagine Congress or a State Legislature trying to be unanimous!) This would not be the case with the new project. The Assembly would not require a vote on the crucial issue of war or peace. On other "important questions" the debate could be settled with a two-thirds vote. "Other questions" could be passed by a majority vote.

At once the problem arises: what is an "important question?" The proposed charter does not leave this a matter of vague opinion; it lists the principle "important" decisions:

Recommendations on questions of peace which the General Assembly decides to make to the Security Council.

Election of members to the Council, that is, seats for those two-year members.

Election of members to the Economic and Social Council.

Admission, suspension and expulsion of member nations.

Budget questions.

TROUBLES OF THE LEAGUE

3. A continuing charge against the old League was that its machinery was so cumbersome that it had no "teeth". Threats of aggression, or even *actual* aggression, could take place, and there would be nothing done except endless

debating, appointment of tedious investigating commissions, and dishonest buck-passing.

Another criticism was that certain nations tried to keep the peace of the world on their own, *outside* the League. Examples of both criticisms may be recalled in the result of the work of the Lytton Commission, which did report against the Jap invasion of Manchuria—but after a year it became too late to remedy, except by a war—for which no peace-loving nation was prepared; the Hoare-Laval Pact, which suggested that Mussolini should be rewarded for his crime by being given a large slice of Ethiopia; the Non-Intervention Committee, which actually permitted, if it did not encourage, German and Italian intervention in Spain; and the endless arguments and undercover agreements about Italian action in Albania, German aggression in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland; and the Japanese invasion of central and southern China.


The proposed United Nations' Security Council would be supplied with "teeth."

The Security Council would first attempt to get a settlement by discussion or court action. If that failed, it then "takes any necessary measures." The early steps, short of armed measures, would be of the kind that the old League called "economic sanctions," but much stiffer. They could call on any or all members, and impose diplomatic, economic or "other measures" in an attempt to stop the aggression. Quoting from the recommendations made at Dumbarton Oaks:

"Such measures may include complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations."

It should be noted that the former method of listing certain essential war materials to be barred by economic sanction has been dropped. The current suggestion is simply that *all transport and communications* should be cut off, so that disturbers of the peace—or suspected disturbers—just won't have any way to get the stuff.

If this drastic action failed to do the trick: *force*. The fact



that exertion of important economic sanctions might lead to war was one of those things which the spineless League never seemed to grasp. Fear of war was what induced the League to impose mild economic sanctions on Mussolini when he was about to invade Ethiopia—so mild that the two things which would have stopped him were not tried: closing the Suez Canal, and putting a ban on oil supplies.

THE MAILED FIST

Suggestions for the proposed United Nations organization are not so faint-hearted. If interruption of communications and diplomatic and economic action don't prove effective against an aggressor, then "...the Security Council...should be empowered to take such action by air, naval or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, block-



ade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the organization."


That means a shooting war in any man's language. But then the final and trickiest problem:


Where does the Security Council, which has no armed forces of its own, get armies, navies and airforces?

That too, is taken care of in the provisional charter:

"...all members of the organization...should undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements concluded among themselves, armed forces, facilities, and assistance necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such agreement or agreements should govern the numbers and types of force and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided."

It will be observed that there is still a major problem to be tackled. How will it be possible to get fast, almost immediate, action? During almost the whole of 1935 the old League debated whether it would spank Mussolini or simply slap





his wrist, and dawdled along in debate while the world started to go to pot. This point, and other lessons of the 1930's, haven't been overlooked at Dumbarton Oaks, and so we have this final recommendation:

PLANES FOR PEACE

"In order to enable urgent military measures to be taken by the organization there should be held **IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE** by the members of the organization national airforce contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action should be determined by the Security Council, with the assistance of the military staff committee."

Here we have the crux of the problem tackled in straightforward fashion and in plain language.

It is recognized that, should there be another war, an aggressor is not likely to indulge in the

"old-fashioned" advance declaration of his intentions. He won't risk causing alarm by moving his land forces up to some one else's frontier. The next war, should there be one, might start off with a tremendous air attack, or with fifty-ton robot bombs instead of the one- or two-tonners used in the latter half of 1944.

The vastly increased power of air attack has not been overlooked during the past few years. It has certainly been stepped up, especially in tonnage of bombs dropped. Now we can drop as many tons of bombs on an objective in two or three minutes as Germany dropped on Britain during the whole of World War II.

Therefore the Dumbarton Oaks plan is to have airforces, nationally controlled, but on immediate call for action against an aggressor by the "eleven men who would regulate the world."


This temporarily gets around the difficult question involved in



SECURITY COUNCIL



INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE




GENERAL ASSEMBLY



SECRETARIAT



ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL



MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

the establishment of international armies or an international police force. It is suggested that these might come later. The immediate objective is to devise a plan which will ensure peace: peace by force. [The world wants security before justice, because without security there can be no justice.

Other factors, in addition to the methods of using collective force to make the world better, are taken up in the Dumbarton Oaks recommendations.

An International Court of Justice is provided for, the use of which may be had even by nations who are not members of the world organization, on conditions to be decided by the General Assembly on advice of the Security Council. This may be either the present Permanent Court of International Justice, to which the United States has not belonged, or a new one to be set up.

ADVISORY BODIES

International economic and social cooperation has not been overlooked. Various specialized and technically qualified bodies are suggested, so that human rights and the Four Freedoms will be amply taken care of. Even bitter critics of the old League of Nations have recognized that the non-political aspects of the about-to-be discarded League did exceptionally useful work, especially in dealing with labor problems, the dope traffic, white slavery, etc.

Enemy nations will not be barred from admission "sometime" to this world organization. That time may be many, many years in the future, but it is specified that membership should be open "to all peace-loving States."

The conferees at Dumbarton Oaks tackled some very difficult problems, but they did not hope to settle all the world's ailments in one six-weeks' session. At least two questions of vital importance have been left for further consideration:

1. What forces should be "earmarked" for call by decision of the Security Council?


2. Shall the Big Four have the right to veto action against one of themselves by exercising their votes *against* taking any action?



The first of these questions touches on the delicate question of national sovereignty. It is a question which nations will debate long and hard, because it means, if agreed to, that an *international* body would have jurisdiction over

a national force. The American people, and especially the American Congress and Senate, have had twenty-five years to debate this question without reaching firm agreement. But never until recently has the problem been posed so clearly and vividly.

The second question concerns the way in which the Security Council should vote and act. The Big Four nations could come to no agreement in principle as to how they should deal with a problem where they themselves might



disagree. No decision was reached, as may be seen from a clause in the plan:

“NOTE: — The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration.”

During the hazards of war the United Nations, clustered around the Big Four, have worked effectively together. They have pooled their military, economic and intellectual resources to the point that the “unconditional surrender” of Axis aggressors and satellites is assured.

ALLIED TEAMWORK

Teamwork in war has paid dividends. Teamwork can win the peace!

Why is one justified in being optimistic about the future? About plans to maintain peace? About possibility, even probability, of preventing a World War III?

There are several reasons:

1. We have had the chance to learn from the tragic lessons of World War I. Many leaders today are old enough, and mentally and physically active enough, to know that other war's lessons first hand. That war cost us more than 50,000 men killed in action or dead from battle wounds; and more than \$50,000,000,000 — fifty billion dollars. (This war has already seen American fatalities double and our dollar cost more than quadruple that of War I.)

Interallied cooperation during World War I was a remarkable achievement for its time, but it was not begun in some things until tragically late. An Interallied Shipping Committee was set up in 1917, but was partly hamstrung because “it included neither Ministers with power to speak on behalf of their several Governments on questions of policy, nor officials responsible for the current work of arranging shipping and supplies.” It was not until Foch was appointed in March, 1918, that



there was even unified military command.

2. Very soon after "cease fire" was sounded on Armistice Day, interallied cooperation and other wartime controls were gradually dropped, one by one. France urged the continuation of economic cooperation into the uneasy peace period, but was outvoted. This time it is widely accepted that many purely national controls will be lessened or dropped, but that numerous aspects of *international cooperation* must remain and in perhaps changed forms become part of our world system. It has been learned the hard way that, in our own interest, it may have been better not to have ignored the League of Nations, imperfect as it was; and not to have stayed out of the World Court.


3. The growing use of commercial aircraft—or passenger-carrying military planes—has done a great deal to make cooperation effective this time. President Roosevelt could ask Secretary of State Cordell Hull to go and talk to Marshal Stalin in Moscow for a couple of days; Prime Minister Winston Churchill can telephone Foreign Affairs Secretary Eden in London, telling him to join him on the morrow in Quebec. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin have had several heart-to-heart talks. The first two and Chiang-Kai-Shek have been able to get together only once. They have, jointly, met with Stalin only once. (Chiang-Kai-Shek and Stalin are busy actually com-

manding their armies). But Roosevelt and Churchill have met ten times since the war began in Europe. These get-togethers would not have been feasible in World War I. Until after the Armistice in 1918 the political chiefs of state of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy had never met.

4. It is only the relatively rare meetings of political heads that have counted in creation of understanding and intimate cooperation. Cabinet ministers have met. Chiefs of Staff are frequently conferring with each other. Economic and other mission, technical experts, virtually live together.

WE FIGHT SIDE BY SIDE

In the field, American, British and other nations' officers work together, at SHAEF, or in "Monty's" caravan. This began, so far as the Americans are concerned, in North Africa, where Eisenhower set a first-rate pattern. In addition, Americans, British, French, Poles, Norwegians, Czechs and others, in the intermediate and lower levels of command, sleep, mess, and work together.



And, in conference after conference, such as the financial meeting at Bretton Woods, N.H., and the food sessions in Virginia Hot Springs and Montreal — dozens of meetings — intelligent anticipation of future needs has been thrashed out. Dumbarton Oaks is one of the more recent.

5. The lessons of World War I, the debating period between the wars, and the wider forum of informed discussion, have stimulated, educated and altered public opinion in the United States. This is demonstrated by the fact that both major political parties have planks in their platforms endorsing continued international cooperation after the war. It is shown by every public opinion poll published in the past two or three years.

We cannot escape the fact that "there is no spot on earth that is more than sixty hours' flying time from your local airport." Evidence of the kind of cooperation that has been possible in war time and of the necessity for continuing to work together in peacetime, comes from many famous leaders. General George C. Mar-

shall, US Army Chief of Staff says:

"Our power to defeat the enemy with certainty and without the bitter cost of long delays has been largely due to the carefully-organized cooperation of the British-American forces under unity of command... Let us finish this terrible business as a great team, the greatest the world has ever known, and then resolve the conflicting *peacetime interests of our countries* with something of the orderly procedure which has enabled us to compose our military differences in the much more difficult business of conducting a global war."

War is infinitely more costly than peace. General Marshall believes that it is also more difficult to conduct a war than to "conduct" peace. To achieve our objectives in peacetime, there is overwhelming evidence that the investment of men, money, brains and energy that we have put, and are putting, into the war will not be allowed to fail us this time.

GIs who have been away from home one year, two years, or even longer, may not have been able to detect how the national pulse has been stirred with a determination that we Americans shall be masters of our fate. It is not the purpose of this issue of ARMY TALKS to discuss the thinking that has been going on about national problems. But in the international field many vital questions are being thrashed out in public and

private. "Our folks" are meeting, in small groups and in public forums, to raise questions and to seek answers. What are some of the questions? And how are they — broadly and quite unofficially — being answered? Let's look at a few:

Should the Governments of the United Nations, at this time, arrive at and announce a "common strategy for peace?"

(This was asked long before Dumbarton Oaks, and will continue to be asked).

Answer: The development of plans for the peace should be a continuing process. No attempt should be made at this time to reach final agreements on all points. Much naturally depends on actual conditions that will exist at the end of the war. Since these conditions cannot be known, they cannot be planned for in detail. Nevertheless, it is possible and desirable to settle general policies. One error in 1918 and thereafter was to try to come to too many final settlements too soon.

How should the final peace settlement be reached?

Answer: No "final" settlement in the ordinary sense should be tried. Peacemaking in the style of Vienna — after the Napoleonic wars — and of Versailles are obsolete. Postwar problems should be tackled before the war ends and work toward solutions for many years. At some stage peace will be legally restored (It was not done last time until December 20, 1921) but there will be a hangover of many other problems. Unfinished tasks should be turned over to an international organization, as soon as we get one, and ordinary ideas of peacemaking should be scrapped.

Many questions should be left to technical experts to struggle with; not to settle, but to present their views for the consideration of our elected leaders.

How should Germany be punished?

Answer: Prevailing opinion favors justice, not revenge. War Criminals must definitely be tried, and the guilty punished. (See No. 43 issue of ARMY TALKS for further treatment of this subject.) Germans should also be punished for inhumane acts against the Jews. There should be reparations for war damage to the extent that is economically feasible. The Soviet Union should be able to rebuild much of her devastation through import of German material and labor.

THE GERMAN FUTURE

Effective measures must be taken to keep permanently disarmed, whether or not a system of world collective security can be quickly worked out. Germany's political system should be her own affair, so long as it is not a threat to world peace. Most opinion is not in favor of cutting up German territory, but would permit her to get food and other relief if and when her victims had been adequately taken care of. "Ultimate



ly" she should be treated as a nation equal to others in the world... How to reeducate German youth? No practical answer can yet be discovered in American thought.

Should there be an international organization for general security against military aggression, and should the United States join it?

Answer: The "ayes" seem to have it—definitely. Planks in both major political parties favor joining some kind of international security organization.

WORLD SECURITY DEMANDS ORGANIZATION

The reasons for joining are not high-flown ones. They are expressed under four general headings:

1. Security against military aggression.

2. Freedom from having to keep up a large, strong and expensive armed force.

3. Maintenance of civil liberties and democratic institutions.

4. Holding fast to our American economic systems and thus making sure our prosperity and standard of living can be protected and improved.

The questions raised and the answers given are by no means to

be taken as official army doctrine, or the official policy of the Government of the United States. These are expressions of opinion which have gradually and recently come to light through public opinion polls and reports of discussion groups throughout the country.

There is almost no feeling today, as there was before Pearl Harbor in some places, that the United States is immune from attack. There is almost no belief that two oceans, in the contracted world we have today, will give adequate protection from international gangsters.

Dumbarton Oaks conference has tackled in vigorous fashion many of the international issues about which Americans are thinking. Its recommendations, in general and specific form, have been made public in advance of the end of the war. In this way it is believed Americans will have their eyes wide open to the problems, and will have some suggested answers on which they can argue.

It isn't a settled question by any means, this problem of achieving security. But all the facts that are available have been laid on the table for free, open and American discussions.





NEWSCOPE



"It should be recognized that news is not the sacred property of the press, but something in the public domain. In time of war the Armed Forces themselves are creators of news and have therefore a vested interest in the way it is reported and edited by Information Services. The all-important question pertaining to news and information is how victory can best be expedited by the truthful use of news. The truth works for our side."

The Chinese government, anticipating a blockade of their coast, began to build the Burma Road to their backdoor, in late 1937. It was completed January 1939 and from that moment Burma assumed a new strategic importance. Each month, 12,000 tons of supplies were shipped by sea to Rangoon, carried from there by rail to Lashio, and then by truck over the new road's 705 miles of steep grades and hairpin curves into Western China.

The Japs conquered most of Burma by 6 May 1942. In late 1943 and early 1944, Allied counter-offensives edged slowly and painfully into Burma from three directions as shown by arrows on the map:

ALLIED OFFENSIVES

(1) Troops in the north pushed from Ledo through Myitkyna and now are fighting in the vicinity of Bhamo. American engineers followed this drive, building the new Ledo road designed to link up with the old Burma Road. Today the gap between the two roads has been narrowed to 200 miles.

(2) Forces in the center plodded through the Chin Hills from Imphal toward Mandalay. Last month they captured "impregnable" Kennedy Peak which rises some 9,000 feet into perpetual mists. The sun never shines on the path, no wider than a railroad track, leading to the peak.

(3) Little headway has been made by the third prong of the offensive toward Akyab.

Part of the gasoline for Allied Armies flows by a secret pipe-line from Calcutta across Burma to China. The completed portion, already the largest operational pipe-line in the world, is supplying gasoline in India and North Burma. It will free the Ledo road and air tonnage for other war essentials.

THE BATTLEGROUND

The Burma battleground is larger than France. It is 750 miles from Rangoon to the Chinese frontier in the north and 400 miles wide at the level of Mandalay. Large scale military operations are limited to the period of good weather from October to May. Air forces are hampered during the rest of the year by overcast skies, while ground forces are bogged down by heavy rains, averaging 400 inches a year in some sections. (New York City's annual average, 50 inches; U.S. middle west, 20 to 40 inches.) 750,000 British and Indian Troops and an unknown number of American and Chinese forces are fighting in this typical jungle-country of heavy undergrowth, swamps, mist, mud, lice, leeches and heat.

Burma is one path to Tokyo. The difficulty of that path is one reason why the best estimators predict that a minimum of 18 to 24 months will be needed to whip Japan after the fall of Germany.

LISTEN : Tune in your American Forces Network for a dramatized version of the week's ARMY TALKS.
Time : 1030 Saturday, 23rd December.

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COMBAT TIPS

"We cannot get brakeshoses for our jeeps. We have removed the brakeshoses from the 1/4 ton trailers and installed them in our jeeps."

Don'ts in an anti-tank gun squad:

1. Don't set up on a crossroad. Jerry has them all zeroed in.

2. Don't let the squad ride into the gun position. Dismount and manhandle the gun. One shell almost got our truck, gun and squad.

3. Don't move around the gun position. A German tank saw one of our men, and though the gun was hidden, became suspicious and got away.

4. Don't go into a gun position blind. More than once if I hadn't reconnoitered, I'd have led my platoon into an enemy stronghold.

"If an enemy attack on the flank is repulsed, I always get out my am as he will usually hit my positions next."

"The Germans have a healthy respect for the M-1. Most important are well-aimed shots, increased rate of fire, and the use of slings in combat. If you see a Jerry who does not see you, there is no reason for hasty unaimed fire."

"A surprise attack by the Infantry without tanks will often catch the enemy unaware. The noise of the tanks warming up warns him of an impending attack. On one occasion when a tank-Infantry attack had failed, we attacked the next morning in a slight ground haze without tanks or artillery and caught most of the enemy asleep."

"We always cut a gap in the enemy wire. Usually we are able to pick up a prisoner who is sent out to repair the line."

"Make sure that all men have fired the heavy MG using the light MG tripod. We use it oftener than the heavy tripod."

"We have removed the backs of seats in our tanks to facilitate handling of am and to give access to escape hatches. The escape hatch levers have been removed as they frequently stick. The hatches are then fastened with wire."

"The shape of a mortar crater is influenced by the direction of flight and the angle of the mortar shell. A shell falling vertically will cause a round crater. The greater the range from the mortar, the less the angle of descent. The shape of the crater then gives clearer indication of the direction of flight."

"The ground around a crater is grooved into a pattern. The grooves extending furthest outward from the hole run perpendicular to the direction of the mortar. The mortar fin and fuze splinters bury themselves along the line of flight at the bottom of the inner crater and in front of the point of detonation. They can be found by gently probing. A clue to the direction of the mortar can be obtained by extending a line along the tunnel made by the fin to the point of detonation."

"When the crater is distinct, the line of flight can be determined more easily as the edge of the wall furthest from the mortar will have undercut turf while the nearest edge will be blasted clear of growth."

"Examination of the fins permits determination of type. 120mm mortar fins have a diameter of 4 3/4 inches; 80mm, 3 1/4 inches."

"The general area of enemy mortar positions may be determined by plotting on a map the crater and lines of flight as determined from the crater and from azimuths reported by listening posts. As the enemy doctrine of mortar employment corresponds to our own, careful examination of a large scale map often will permit tying down probable mortar positions to a small area."

"Infantry accompanying tanks should avoid using an opening that a tank has just used. The enemy frequently lays on these openings immediately the passage of a tank is observed. Also we have used white phosphorous grenades in the infantry squads to point out targets for the tanks."



ME AND ALVINA



The tale commences with last week when me, Alvina and Redball are pulled over to the side of the road and I am telling Redball the beauties of nature. He says he is with memory of better looking nature at Minsky's when a half-track slows down alongside Alvina and a little squiffle with specs jumps off.

He gladhands me and asks if I am Querty. I tells him I am.

"Well, Joe, it's my job to check on the way you fellows distribute the mag. We're hearing rumors you are charging for it and you ain't telling the fellows to pass it along. There's one copy for every ten guys and every guy should get a chance to read it."

I can see someone should Orientate this bird. He is against free enterprise. Redball with toughness tells him he ain't got no call to stop two GIs from getting a post-war steak together.

"Yeah, but if you charge some guy for it what makes you think he is going to let someone else read it free?"

I can see this crump is not with understanding of us soldiers. I in person know that every GI with which I transact is generous enough to pass his copy along. I huddle with Redball and he is soon telling me about an old 86th St. custom known as buttering the palm. This custom is somewhat of a bright glim, but as I was with suspicion, the truth betrays itself. This sheep in wolf's clothes is saying as how Redball and me would not want a reputation as being war profiteers.

He is with the opinion as we should be giving—not taking.

Redball is ready to give all right. With the chopper. I hold him with restraint and make with the assurance that we are meaning no harm and will mend our ways. We continue our route—with a hurry as this character chases us, hollering something about a lift. I am not a guy with bitterness but I ain't going to give no guy a lift what has just bankrupted me.

We have promised to give with the ARMY TALKS free—but nothin ain't been said about no luxury tax.

QUERTY.

